Source: “GOD AND THE UNIVERSE OF FAITHS: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion”, By John Hick, Danforth Professor of the Philosophy of Religion, 1993.
1. Theology's Central Problem.mp4
6. Theologys Central Problem.mp3
This material explores the central problem facing theology today, particularly within the Judeo-Christian tradition: whether religious language should be understood as cognitive (making claims that are true or false) or non-cognitive (serving other functions like expressing emotion or commitment). The author argues that past theological debates were internal, but the current challenge, fueled by philosophical developments like logical positivism and Wittgenstein's "language games," questions the very nature of religious claims. Ultimately, the author contends that embracing a non-cognitive view would lead to a "religious suicide" by stripping faith of its ability to assert truths about a transcendent God and the universe, instead advocating for directly confronting the formidable challenges to a cognitive understanding, such as the problem of evil and conflicting truth-claims.
Here is a summary of 20 major topics discussed in the source, each grouped individually and presented with a bolded designation:
Topic 1 Theology’s central problem has undergone a significant transformation. Historically, it concerned internal theological debates, such as the struggle between monotheism and polytheism, the relationship between God the Father and God the Son, the reformation of the church in the sixteenth century, or integrating the implications of evolutionary theory in the nineteenth century. However, the current problem is external and all-encompassing, challenging the very nature and status of theology itself. This new situation presents a fundamental question about theology’s foundational claims.
Topic 2 From a philosophical perspective, the central issue revolves around religious language. Specifically, it asks whether distinctively religious utterances function as cognitive or non-cognitive uses of language. Cognitive language is used to state facts or alleged facts, conveying information that can be assessed as true or false. Non-cognitive language, on the other hand, includes uses like poetry, commands, exclamations, greetings, and performative utterances, none of which are typically evaluated in terms of truth or falsehood.
Topic 3 While the cognitive/non-cognitive distinction is a crucial starting point for understanding religious language, it is acknowledged as a broad tool. The discussion notes that a more detailed analysis of human speech, such as that developed by J. L. Austin, would reveal a network of illocutionary forces (e.g., commissive, verdictive) within religious utterances. These forces are not directly assessed for truth value. However, despite the rich variety of linguistic uses, the fundamental question remains whether religious statements like "God loves mankind" belong to the class of sentences that are either true or false.
Topic 4 It is important to differentiate between statements about religion and statements that are distinctively religious. For instance, anthropological or historical reports about religious beliefs and practices (e.g., "Muslims believe Mohammed was the prophet of Allah") are straightforwardly indicative and are statements about religion, not religious uses of language themselves. Similarly, historical facts foundational to a religion, such as Jesus living in the first century and being crucified by Pontius Pilate, are declarative but not distinctively religious. They can be established by ordinary historical research.
Topic 5 The core of the cognitive/non-cognitive issue in religious language lies in what is termed the "metaphysical surplus." This refers to the transcendent component in religious statements, specifically the "God-talk," that goes beyond purely historical or descriptive claims. For example, "God was at work in the life of Jesus of Nazareth" is problematic because, unlike statements about observable entities (e.g., "The Prime Minister was acting through the Foreign Secretary"), there is no general agreement on how to determine or verify the truth value of statements involving God. This lack of agreed-upon truth-value determination leads to suspicion that such statements may lack truth value altogether.
Topic 6 The challenge to the meaningfulness of religious language gained prominence with the school of logical positivism in the 1920s and 1930s. A key principle highlighted by this movement is that for a statement asserting the existence or reality of something (be it an electron, a human, or God) to have any meaning, it must make an "appropriate experienceable difference." If the existence of "x" makes no discernible difference within human experience, then asserting its existence is considered to not truly assert anything. This principle led to the claim that "God-talk" is "logically hollow" because it does not lend itself to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation, thus lacking indicative meaning and functioning only non-cognitively.
Topic 7 One specific non-cognitive use assigned to religious language by early logical positivists, notably A. J. Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic, is that of emotive expression. According to this view, religious language, similar to ethical and aesthetic language, functions primarily to give vent to the speaker's emotional state and perhaps to induce similar feelings in listeners. For example, language of religious thanksgiving would express euphoria, while penitence would express depression. However, taken literally, religious utterances referring to an unobservable entity like God were deemed meaningless by this perspective.
Topic 8 Professor J. H. Randall of Columbia University proposed a more sophisticated non-cognitive theory, viewing religious language as the "language of myth and symbol." On his view, religious symbols are non-representative and non-cognitive, symbolizing what they themselves do or their peculiar functions, rather than referring to an external, independently observable entity. The primary function of these symbols is to draw attention to aspects of the world that evoke specific feelings in the human mind, such as "numinous awe" and "cosmic dependence," akin to how aesthetic language expresses feelings evoked by the natural world.