Source: “The Fifth Dimension: An Exploration Of The Spiritual Realm”, By John Hick*,* Danforth Professor of the Philosophy of Religion, 2013.
4. Windows on the Transcendent.mp4
This material explores various "windows on the transcendent," phenomena that suggest a reality beyond purely physical or naturalistic explanations. It begins by challenging the mind-brain identity theory, arguing that consciousness cannot simply be brain activity because mental experiences (like visualizing a scene) are qualitatively different from physical neural processes. The text then discusses epiphenomenalism, where consciousness is a non-physical byproduct of the brain, but critiques this view for making consciousness causally ineffective, thus posing an evolutionary paradox. Furthermore, the source highlights the dilemma of determinism and free will, positing that if all thoughts are physically determined or random, genuine rational thought and belief are impossible. Beyond the mind, the author identifies beauty in nature and profound human experiences like love, community, and especially the transformative lives of "mahatmas" or saints, as "signals of transcendence" that hint at a deeper, non-physical dimension of reality, ultimately inviting a suspension of naturalistic assumptions.
This briefing document summarizes key themes and arguments from the provided source, focusing on the nature of consciousness, signals of transcendence in the natural world and human life, and the inherent limitations of a purely naturalistic worldview.
Here are the top 15 major topics discussed in the source, presented individually and with detailed explanations:
Topic 1: The Mind-Brain Identity Theory This theory, also known as central state materialism, posits that mental life, including consciousness and its unconscious depths, is either identical to or an epiphenomenon of the brain's functioning. Proponents believe there is a complete correlation between mental and cerebral events, meaning that every moment of consciousness corresponds to a changed state in the brain. According to this view, conscious states are simply brain states, not two different kinds of events (one physical and one non-physical). Consciousness is considered to be nothing more than changing states of the brain, consisting of electrochemical activity.
Topic 2: The Implausibility of Mind-Brain Identity Despite its initial appeal, the mind-brain identity theory is argued to be implausible because mental and physical events are fundamentally different. For instance, if a patient is visualizing a complex scene like a seaside bay with sparkling waves and a ruined castle, the electrical activity recorded in their brain is seen as causing this mental content, or being necessary for it to occur. However, it is considered incoherent to claim that the visualized scene itself, with its colors and images, literally is the activity in the grey matter of the brain. The brain contains synaptic connections and electrical flows, but not literal pictures or colors, indicating a clear qualitative difference between the subjective experience and the physical brain state.
Topic 3: Neuroscientists' Perspectives on Consciousness Many eminent neuroscientists have expressed profound mystery regarding the nature and status of consciousness. They acknowledge an "unexplained gap" between physical and subjective phenomena. Questions about the human mind and consciousness remain largely unanswered despite centuries of research. Some believe that conscious actions, perceptions, and understanding cannot be fully explained within the current understanding of the material universe and may require a new physical framework. Even those who propose that consciousness consists of "ripples in the brain" admit they cannot precisely describe how a large number of neurons acquire the emergent property of consciousness. Others state that while electroencephalographs and functional MRI scans capture correlates of the mind, these correlates are not the mind itself, concluding that consciousness extends beyond mere neuroscience, psychology, or philosophy.
Topic 4: Consciousness/Brain Identity as a Non-Scientific Hypothesis The idea that consciousness is identical to brain activity is not considered a genuine scientific hypothesis because it cannot be empirically confirmed or falsified. There are no conceivable experiments whose results could definitively move beyond demonstrating a correlation to proving identity. This physicalist assumption is therefore regarded as a "speculative belief" rather than a scientifically proven proposition.
Topic 5: Epiphenomenalism as a Naturalistic Alternative Epiphenomenalism is presented as a more plausible naturalistic alternative to mind-brain identity, which acknowledges the non-physical nature of consciousness. This theory suggests that consciousness, though distinct from brain activity, is a temporary by-product of it. An analogy used is that of a light bulb: it lights up when electricity passes through its filaments, but the light itself is not the electricity; it ceases when the current is off. Similarly, consciousness occurs while electricity flows through the brain but has no independent existence or causal efficacy, merely reflecting what is happening in the brain without influencing it.
Topic 6: The Undermining Implication of Epiphenomenalism The epiphenomenalist theory is undermined by its implication that consciousness has no causal efficacy. If consciousness is merely a passive reflection of brain activity, it means there is no free will and no capacity for the conscious mind to initiate change. From an evolutionary perspective, it becomes difficult to explain how something so useless to an organism, which offers no survival value and makes no difference to an animal's behavior, could have emerged. If consciousness is purely epiphenomenal, the world would function identically whether it existed or not, making its emergence an incomprehensible anomaly under the assumption that new features establish themselves due to their survival advantage.
Topic 7: The Problem of Free Will within Physicalism A significant anomaly arises within any physicalist framework, whether it embraces mind-brain identity or a purely epiphenomenal non-physical consciousness: neither allows for genuine free will (referred to as "non-compatibilist" or "libertarian" free will). While an "illusion of free will" might be argued for in a physically determined world (compatibilist free will), the concept of true freedom to choose and act independently is absent. This creates a fundamental dilemma for physicalist perspectives.